1. INTRODUCTION 
Motivation
IN MOST OF THE LITERATURE on mechanism design, the model assumes that a number of economic agents possess a piece of information that is relevant for the efficient allocation of resources. The task of the mechanism designer is to find a game form that induces the agents to reveal their private information. An efficient mechanism is one where the final allocation is efficient given all the private information available in the economy.
In this paper, we take this analysis one step further. We assume that before participating in the mechanism each agent can covertly obtain additional private information at a cost. After the information has been acquired, the mechanism is executed. Hence the primitive notion in our model is an information gathering technology rather than a fixed informational type for each player. It is clear that the properties of the mechanism to be played in the second stage affect the players' incentives to acquire information in the ex ante stage.
The main results in this paper characterize information acquisition in ex post efficient mechanisms. Efficiency of a mechanism in this paper is understood in the same sense as in the original contributions by Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves. In particular, we do not impose balanced budget or individual rationality constraints on the mechanism designer. In the independent private values case, we show that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (henceforth VCG) mechanism induces efficient information acquisition at the ex ante stage.
The common values case is much less straightforward to analyze. In light of the recent results by Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) , it is in general impossible to find mechanisms that would induce ex post efficient allocations. Adding an ex ante stage of information acquisition does not alleviate this problem. The two basic requirements for incentive compatibility of the efficient allocation rule are that the signals to the agents be single dimensional and that the allocation rule be monotonic in the signals. Even when these two conditions are met, we show that any efficient ex-post mechanism does not result in ex ante efficient information acquisition. We use ex post equilibrium as our solution concept. An attractive feature of this concept for problems with endogenously determined information is that the mechanisms do not depend on the distributions of the signals. By the revenue equivalence theorem, any allocation rule that can be supported in an ex post equilibrium results in the same expected payoffs to all of the players as the VCG mechanism, provided that the lowest type receives the same utility in the mechanisms. But the defining characteristic of the VCG mechanism is that an agent's payoff changes only when the allocation changes due to his announcement of the signal. As a result, the payoffs cannot reflect the direct informational effects on other ageats, and hence the private and social incentives will differ in general.
We also investigate the direction in which the incentives to acquire information are distorted. We restrict our attention to the case where the efficient allocation rule can be implemented in an ex post equilibrium and derive new necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex post implementability. It turns out that under our sufficient conditions for implementability, the information acquisition problem also satisfies the conditions for the appropriate multi-agent generalization of a monotone environment as defined in Karlin and Rubin (1956) and Lehmann (1988) . As a result, we can expand the scope of our theoly beyond signal structures that satisfy Blackwell's order of informativeness to the much larger class of signals ordered according to their effectiveness as defined in Lehmann (1988) . We show that in settings with conflicting interests between agent i and all other agents, as expressed by their marginal utilities, every ex post efficient mechanism results in excessive information acquisition by agent i. With congruent interests between agent i and agents -i, there is too little investment in information by agent i at the ex ante stage.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in the next section. Section 3 presents the case of a single unit auction as an example of the general theory. The analysis of the independent private values case is given in Section 4. Results on efficient ex post implementation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 deals with ex ante efficiency in the common values case and Section 7 concludes. This paper is related to two strands of literature in mechanism design. It extends the ideas of efficient mechanism design pioneered by Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) , and Groves (1973) in an environment with fixed private information to an environment with information acquisition.
Our results on ex-post efficient mechanisms in common values environments complement recent work by Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) . Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) suggest a generalization of the VCG mechanism to obtain an efficient allocation in the context of multi-unit auctions with common values. Jehiel and Moldovanu analyze the efficient design in a linear setting with multidimensional signals and interdependent allocations. We give necessary conditions as well as weaker sufficient conditions for the efficient design in a general nonlinear environment. The results here are valid for general allocation problems and not only for single or multi-unit auctions.
The existing literature on information acquisition in mechanism design is restricted almost entirely to the study of auctions.' In the private values setting, Tan (1992) considers a procurement model where firms invest in R&D expenditure prior to the bidding stage. In the symmetric equilibrium with decreasing returns to scale, he observes that revenue equivalence holds between first and second price auction. Stegeman (1996) shows that the second price auction induces efficient information acquisition in the single unit independent private values case. Our results in the private values case can thus be seen as extensions of these earlier results. We show that analogous results hold for a much larger class of models and that as long as the conditions of the revenue equivalence theorem are satisfied, there is no need to analyze separately different indirect mechanisms that result in efficient allocation. Matthews (1977 and 1984) considers endogenous information acquisition in a pure common values auction and analyzes the convergence of the winning bid to the true value of the object when the number of bidders increases. Those papers are different from our papers in at least two respects. First, Matthews compares given auction forms for a single unit auction rather than taking a mechanism design approach to general allocation problems. Second, as Matthews considers the pure common value model, the efficient level of information acquisition is always identical to zero. Persico (2000) compares the equilibrium incentives of the bidders to acquire information in first and second price auctions within a model of affiliated values. Persico (2000) also uses the same notion of informativeness of information structures as we use. Again the main difference between his approach and ours is that we take the mechanism design approach rather than compare given auction formats for a single-unit auction.
The notable exceptions are Rogerson (1992) , who analyzes an n-person investment and subsequent allocation problem in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium; CrCmer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a and 1998b) . who study information acquisition in a Baron-Myerson adverse selection model; and Auriol and Ga~y-Bobo (1999) , who consider decentralized sampling in a collective decision model for a public good.
MODEL

Payoffs
Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i E .Y= { I , . . . , I ) . The agents have to make a collective choice x from a compact set X of possible alternatives. Uncertainty is represented by a set of possible states of the world, R = xf=,fli, where R , is assumed to be a finite set for every i.3 An element w E R is a vector o = (w,, o-,) = (w,, . . . ,oi,. . . ,o,). The prior distribution q(w) is common knowledge among the players. The marginal distribution over w, is denoted by qi(w,) and we assume that the prior distribution q(w) satisfies independence across i, or
We assume that agent i's preferences depend on the choice x, the state of the world w, and a transfer payment t, in a quasilinear manner:
We also assume that LL, is continuous for all i. The mechanism designer is denoted with a subscript 0, and her utility is assumed to be The model is said to be aprivate val~le model if, for all w, o',
If condition (1) is violated, then the model displays conznzon values.
Signals and Posteriors
Agent i can acquire additional information by receiving a noisy signal about the true state of the world. Let S, be a compact set of possible signal realizations that agent i may observe. Agent i acquires information by choosing a distribution from a family of joint distributions over the space Sj x 0 , : parameterized by a , E A,. We refer to F N~ ( s , , w,) as the signal and s, as the signal realization. Since the conditional distribution of s, depends only on R j and since the prior on R satisfies independence across i, s, is independent of The extension to a compact, but not necessarily finite, state space would only change sums to integrals in the appropriate formulae. sj for all i # j.4 Each A, is assumed to be a compact interval in R. The cost of information acquisition is captured by a cost function cj (cu,) In many instances, it is convenient to let the signal realization sf be directly a posterior belief p, (.) . The experiment a i can then be represented directly by a joint distribution over wi and p,.
The ex-ante efficient allocation requires each individual agent i to acquire the efficient amount of information and the allocation x to be optimal conditional on the posterior beliefs of all agents. Since the model has quasilinear utilities, Pareto efficiency is equivalent to surplus maximization."he social utility is defined by
The expected social surplus of an allocation x conditional on the posterior belief p ( w ) is given by 'Since we focus on ex post equilibria, this independence is not needed for the results on efficient implementation. If we wanted to extend the analysis to Bayesian implementation, then this assumption would have real strength. The independence assumptions allow us to give conditions on the economic fundamentals that lead to over-and u~lderacquisition of i~lforination in the ex ante stage.
"he continuity and compactness assumptions made above are sufficient to guarantee that the choice set of each agent is coinpact and that the objective function is continuous in the choice variable.
k e c a l l that the mechanisin designer collects all the payments and receives utility from them.
The ex-post efficient allocation x(p) maximizes u(x, p ) for a given p . Given the assumptions made in the previous subsection, it is clear that a maximizer exists for all p . Similarly, denote by p-, the information held by all agents but i, with p-, (w) = qi(wi) I-Ij+pj(oj) and let x-;(p-,) be the allocation that maximizes the expected social value u-, (x, p-,) Observe that since we have used the posterior probabilities as arguments in the choice rule, the optimal allocation x(p) does not depend on a. Again, given the continuity and compactness assumptions made in the previous subsection, a solution is guaranteed to exist.
ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLES
In this section, we present an example of a single unit auction with two bidders. It is meant to introduce the basic arguments for the private and common values results and to indicate how to extend the logic of the arguments to any number of agents and allocations. A similar example is discussed in Maskin (1992) with a signal space but without an underlying state space. After presenting the example, we briefly discuss the role of the independence assumptions of o, across i by arguing how it could arise in the auction setting and then in a different environment, namely procurement.
Infonnation Acqz~isition in an Auction
The set of allocations is the set of possible assignments of the object to bidders, or X = {xI, x2), where x, denotes the decision to allocate the object to bidder i E {1,2). The state space of agent i is given by R,= {0,1). We begin with a private value model, where the value of the object for bidder i is u,(x,, o ) = 2wi and u,(x, w) = 0 for x # x i . We let the signal of agent i be simply his posterior belief p, = Pr(wi = 1). The expected (ex-post) utility for agent i depends on p i and pi: ui(x,, pi, p,) = 2p,.' The direct VCG mechanism in this setting is the second price auction where bidder i pays the reported valuation of bidder j conditional on obtaining the object. Ex post efficiency implies that i gets the object if LL, (xi, pi, pi) L LL~(X,, p i , pj), i.e. if p, L p,. It follows that the equilibrium utility of bidder i, conditional on obtaining the object, is u,(x,, pi,pj) -uj(xj, pi, p,).
For an arbitrary fixed realization pj = j , the valuations by i and j are depicted in Figure l a as functions of pi. The equilibrium net utility of bidder i has the same slope in pi as the social utility, as displayed in Figure lb .
Consider next information acquisition within this auction. With a binary state structure, a signal is more informative if the posteriors are more concentrated around 0and 1. Around j, a local increase in informativeness can be represented as a lottery (with equal probability) over j -E and j +E for some E z 0. The convexity of the equilibrium net utility (see Figure lb) implies that information has a positive value. More importantly, the private marginal value of the lottery coincides with the social marginal value. As a result each agent acquires the socially efficient level of information. The logic of this argument extends to all private value problems as the utility L L -~(~, p ) of all agents but i is constant in pi.
To extend the example to a common values environment, let u,(x,, w) = 2w, + w,. The expected valuation is then ui(x,, pi, p,) = 2pi +p, and under an efficient allocation rule i gets the object when p, > pi. For a given p, = j , the utilities are displayed as functions of p, in Figure 2a . The valuation of bidder j now varies with pi, even though it is less responsive to p i than the valuation of i. The valuations therefore satisfy a familiar single-crossing condition. However, as the valuation of bidder j varies with pi, the original VCG mechanism does not induce truth telling in ex post equilibrium. If we were to apply the mechanism, the equilibrium utility of agent i would be LL; (xi, pi, j ) -uj (x, ,pi,j ) , but for any p, > j, there is an E > 0 such that bidder i could lower his report to pi -E, still get the object, but receive u,(xi, pi,j ) -uj(xj, pi-E , j ) > ui(xi, pi, j ) -u,(xi,pi,j ) .
The above argument remains valid until pi = j, where a lower report would induce an undesirable change in the allocation. Thus by asking bidder i to pay u,(xj, j,j ) , incentive compatibility is preserved. The equilibrium utility of agent i is then u,(xi, pi,j ) -uj(xj, j , j ) . When we now compare the slopes of individual payoffs and social payoffs locally at j , we find that the equilibrium utility of agent i has a sharper kink than the social utility as depicted in Figure 2b .
As before, more information can be represented locally as a randomization over posteriors around j . In equilibrium bidder i has excessive incentives to acquire information relative to the socially optimal level as his objective function ' The notation in this section is in minor conflict with the general notation presented in the previous section to take advantage of the binary structure of the example: (i) p, in this section is simply a scalar rather than a probability distribution and (ii) the expected gross utility is written as a function of 11, and p, rather than the implied probability vector y over the state space fl,which is here simply:
D. BERGEMANN AND J. VALIMAICI is (locally) more convex. Conversely, agent i has insufficient incentives to acquire information if du,(x,, y , , y,)/dp, < 0. Next we briefly sketch how these insights generalize beyond the current example. The (single) crossing of the utilities at p, = @ has two important implications. First, it indicates that it is socially efficient to change the assignment from agent j to agent i at p, = j. Consequently the social utility satisfies at pi= pj = j:
Consider an order >-on X, such that xi > xj. If the local condition (7) holds for all pi,pjE [0, 11, then u(x,p,,p,) is supermodular in (x,pi). The second implication of the single crossing condition is that at pi = p i = I j where the latter condition is necessary for truth telling by agent i. (The partial derivative of the second term is naturally equal to zero for all (pi, pj) in auctions without externalities.) If ui(x, pi, pi) is supermodular in (xi, pi), i.e., if we require (8) to hold globally for all pi, pj E [0, 11, we obtain a sufficient condition for truth telling by agent i. Finally, the condition for under-or overacquisition of information by bidder i was related to the responsiveness of the utility of agent j, uj(x, pi,pj) to pi. We can now restate the conditions for overacquisition of information by agent i in terms of or equivalently that uj(x, pi,pi) is submodular in (x, pi). We shall see in the subsequent sections that the supermodularity conditions for u(x, pi, pj) and q ( x , pi,pj) are sufficient and almost necessary conditions for efficient implementation and that sub-or supermodularity conditions for U -~( X , pi,P-~), provide sufficient conditions for over-and underacquisition of information in ex-post efficient mechanism.
Independence
The example just discussed is a linear version of an auction model introduced by Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) to analyze privatization and related asset sale problems. A very similar model with common values and bidders with independent private information appears in Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999) to analyze takeovers (with toeholds). The sale of a company is a fine example to see how the independence of oi across i might arise in substantive economic problems. Consider the sale of a company whose primary value is its client list. The state wi would then describe the extent to which the client list of the target company overlaps with the acquiring firm. The acquiring firm could either value differing client lists (to gain access to new clients) or overlapping client lists (to enhance the cross-selling of products). For competitive reasons, it also matters for firm j how the client list of the target compares with the client list of firm j, which is represented by wj. This introduces the common value aspect into the takeover contest. The single crossing condition in this environment simply states that the marginal value of information about the extent of the intersection between the client list of firm i and the target is larger for firm i than for firm j. The independence of mi across i then amounts to assuming that the clients are distributed independently across the acquiring firms i and j.
The general interpretation in the context of an asset sale, where the value of the asset could arise from a proprietary technology, a marketing strategy, a specific product or market niche or alike, is then that value of the asset for the acquiring firm is determined by the match of the asset with the characteristics of the acquiring firm. The independence assumption requires that the characteristics of the acquiring firms are distributed independently across firms.
Yet a different environment where independence of the state variable wi arises quite naturally, is in the context of procurement and R&D. The following is a stylized version of a model recently analyzed by D'Aspremont, Bhattacharya, and Gerard-Varet (2000) . Their analysis focuses on bargaining with information sharing, whereas we adopt a procurement interpretation. Suppose there are two firms who compete for a contract by the government, regarding a project, say a weapons or software system, which has a social value v. The two firms, i E {1,2), are pursuing the realization of the same project, but follow different design routes or approaches. Uncertainty in the model is described by, for simplicity, a binary state space R, = (0, I), where wi represents the probability that the research of firm i will eventually be successful. If there are many possible ways of pursuing the same goal, it is sensible to assume that the priors on R i satisfy independence. Denote the (expected) cost of firm i of completing the project, independent of eventual failure or success, by y,. The government agency designs a game form that decides which of the firms should pursue the project. The space of possible decisions is then X = {0,1,2,12) where x = i stands for the case where firm i continues with its research, x = 12 denotes the case where both firms continue in the race, and x = 0 denotes the case where neither firm continues with research in the second stage. In the first stage, each firm can obtains information about its research project by observing a signal realization si generated by an information structure a i . Each choice of cui and realization of si result in a posterior belief pi(wI IS,, cu,). We may assume that if w, = w, = 1, then firm i wins the race with probability n-, and firm j with probability .srj. Assuming quasilinearity of the payoffs in the cost, we can write the ex-post utilities uj(x, mi, mi) for the case that both projects receive support by and for the case that only a single project receives support by Since ui(12, w,, wj) depends nontrivially on wj when oi = 1, this model is one with common values. Let pi p , ( o i = llsi, cui) and we observe that the socially optimal decision (conditional on the posterior beliefs) is to have firm i engage in the race (possibly jointly with firm j ) whenever piv -y, > 0 and piv -yi > pjv -yj.
It is efficient to have both firms doing research in the second stage if p i ( l -p j ) v > y i and p j ( l -p , ) v > y j .
In words, only the superior firm should continue with the research if its success is sufficiently certain (this is to avoid duplication of costly effort). If the posterior probability of success is in the intermediate range for both firms, then they should engage in further research j~i n t l y .~ The independence here reflects the fact that each firm is pursuing an independent research program.
PRIVATE VALUES
This section considers information acquisition in the context of independent private values. For this environment Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) , and Groves (1973) showed in increasing generality that the ex-post efficient allocation can be implemented in a direct revelation mechanism.
DEFINITION 1: A direct revelation mechanism is defined by a pair (x, t), where x is an outcome function, x : S + X, and t is a transfer scheme, t : S + R1.
In the private value environment we may consider without loss of generality the set of signal realizations S to be the probability simplex A over the state space 0.The efficient allocation is implemented in dominant strategies if the transfer function has the following form: For all i E 3, where h , (~-~) is an arbitrary function of p-,. We refer to the class of mechanisms that implement the efficient allocation with a transfer function of the form displayed in (10) as tlze Vickrey-Clar.1~-Groves (VCG) mechanism. DEFINITION2: A vector of experiments, a, is a local social optimum if for every i, aisolves
Notice that local here refers to the property that a solves the maximization problem for each agent separately, or Nash locality. In consequence, a local social optimum may not necessarily be a solution to the problem when the experiments of all agents are jointly maximized.
THEOREM 1 (Private Values): With independent private values, every local social optimum can be achieved by the VCG mechanism.
"t can also be verified that the ex-post efficient allocation satisfies the required single crossing properties and hence our results apply to this example as well.
PROOF: See Appendix.
With the VCG mechanism the equilibrium net utility of agent i behaves as the social utility up to hi(p_;), which does not depend on pi.It therefore follows that the decision problem of agent i with respect to the information acquisition in terms of the posterior belief pi is equivalent to the problem faced by the social planner. An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is the following corollaly.
COROLLARY 1: Tlze ex-ante eficierzt allocation can be implemented by the VCG ~necharzism.
The ex-ante stage has many equilibria if there are multiple local social optima." It follows that the VCG mechanism uniquely implements the ex-ante efficient allocation only if there is a unique local and hence global optimum in the information acquisition stage. This efficiency result can also be generalized to environments where each agent can invest ex ante in technologies that increase their private payoffs. The ex-ante efficiency result derived for the VCG mechanism can also be extended to any ex-post efficient mechanism by the revenue equivalence theorem.
In the current model, information is acquired by all agents simultaneously. However, it is well known in statistical decision theory that a sequential decision procedure may dominate any simultaneous procedure as it economizes on the cost of information acquisition. This observation is valid in the current model as well. An important consequence of a sequential version of the VCG mechanism is that the efficient allocation is now strongly implementable as every agent acts at every node as if he were maximizing the social value function (for a more detailed argument see Bergemann and Valimaki (2000) ).
The essential property that allows us to prove ex-ante efficiency with independent private values is the restriction that only agent i can (efficiently) invest in information about his own utility associated with various allocations. The logical next step is therefore to ask whether efficiency can be maintained in environments where the information of agent i is relevant to the utility calculus of agent j. We pursue this question in the context of the interdependent values model investigated recently by Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) . Before we analyze the information acquisition per se, we give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient allocation and associated equilibrium utilities for each agent in the following section.
COMMON VALUES: EX POST EFFICIENCY
We adopt the model of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) to our environment with uncertainty about the true state of nature in subsection 5.1, where we present an (1992) makes a similar observation in the context of ex-ante R&D investments in procurement auctions. necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient implementation with a direct revelation mechanism.") Similar results are briefly stated for a continuous allocation space in subsection 5.2.
Finite Allocation Space
We start by considering a set of finitely many allocations: X = {xo, xl, . . . , xN).
For a fixed a,, player i's expected utility from an allocation x" after observing signal s is, using independence, given by In anticipation of the requirements for the implementability of the efficient allocation rule, we restrict our attention to an arbitrary class of one-dimensional signal realizations Si = [J,, Si] c R with the result that the associated posterior beliefs p,(.ls,, a i ) form a one-dimensional manifold in A(Oi). In this section the allocation problem is analyzed exclusively at the ex-post stage. The utilities are therefore written as functions of (x, s) rather than (x, w ) and consequently x(s) is an ex-post eflcient allocation rule conditional on the signal s. We assume uj(x, s) to be continuously differentiable in s for all i.
Next we present necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient implementation in an ex-post equilibrium. By the revelation principle, we can restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms and truth telling strategies. DEFINITION3: A direct revelation mechanism (x, t) permits implementation in an ex-post equilibrium if Vi, Vs E S:
An ex-post equilibrium, while not requiring dominant strategies, remains a Bayesian equilibrium for any prior distribution over types. For the rest of this subsection, we fix the realization of the signals s-, and focus on truth telling conditions for agent i. Let the set Sl' be defined as the subset of S, for which x" is an efficient allocation:
For any two sets S/ and SI with a nonempty intersection, we call a point s:' E S/ nSi a k to 1 change point if there exists an E > 0 such that either:ll "Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) actually restrict attention to multi-object auctions and achieve implementation through an indirect mechanism in which the bidders report their valuations contingent on the reports by the other bidders, but not directly their signals. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) present sufficient conditions in a linear model for general allocation problems with a direct revelation mechanism.
The condition is written as an eitherlor condition as the social utility may display the same partial derivative with respect to si for the alternatives xk and x' over an interval where the social values of the alternatives x%nd x' are equal.
(12) V s; E (sf', si +&] =+ s; $2s f, S; E S! Symmetrically, we can define s? E S/"n S, ! to be an I to k change point. By extension, let s"' a (ski, s-~). Every change point s"' has the property that at s = s":
Consider next the ex-post truthtelling condition for agent i:
It follows that the transfer payment of agent i has to be constant conditional on the allocation x(s) = x" and we denoted it by tl'.
PROPOSITION 1: A necessaly condition for ex-post implementation is that for V k, V I, at s = s"' PROOF: See Appendix.
The inequality (13) is a familiar local sorting condition and implies that the incentive compatible transfers are uniquely determined (up to a common constant) at the change point s"' by
As the transfer payments t; for every allocation x" are necessarily determined at the change points, it follows that (generically) every pair of sets Sf and Si must have an intersection that forms a connected set, as otherwise tf and ti would be overdetermined. The latter condition can be rephrased as follows:
DEFINITION 4: The collection {S;)f=o satisfies monotonicity if for every n:
A sufficient condition for monotonicity is that the social value u(xn, s) be single-crossing in (x", si). If monotonicity is satisfied, then there exists an optimal policy x(s) such that x'5s chosen on a connected subset R; g S; and nowhere else.12 After possibly relabeling the indices, we can endow the allocation space X with the following order, denoted by <:
"The socially optimal policy x(s) is not unique as any (randomized) allocation over the set {x" x') is optimal for all s, E S," n Sj, and in particular at the change points. Moreover for some xk the corresponding set Rj. may be empty and, in consequence, the associated optimal allocation policy would use only a strict subset of the feasible allocations. Naturally, the order defined in (15) and (16) would then extend only over the subset of allocations selected by the allocation rule x(s).
such that for all si E Rk and s; E Ri, with For the remainder of this section we continue to work with the order defined by (15) and (16).
PROPOSITION 2: A gerzerically necessary condition for ex-post implementatiorz is monotonicity.
The class of mechanisms that implement the efficient allocation with the transfers determined by (14) is referred to as the generalized Viclzrey Clarlz Groves mechanism, where we initialize t: by for some arbitrary hi(s-,). Next we strengthen the local sorting condition to obtain sufficient conditions for ex-post implementation by extending the local to a global sorting condition. Thus if the utility of every agent i displays supermodularity in (x", s;) and monotonicity is satisfied, then an ex-post implementation exists. We wish to emphasize that the particular order imposed on the allocation space X may depend on i and s-;, and all that is required is that for every s-;, an order on X can be constructed such that the conditions above for necessity and sufficiency can be met.
It may be noted that monotonicity and supermodularity are strictly weaker than the conditions suggested by Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) in the context of a multi-unit auction. In the linear (in the signals) version of the model that is investigated by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) , where the necessary and sufficient conditions coincide. For details we refer the reader to an earlier version of the paper (Bergemann and Valimaki (2000)).
Continuum of Allocations
The sorting and monotonicity conditions naturally extend to the case of a continuum of allocations. Let X c R be a compact interval of the real line. As before, fix the realization of signal s-, and let x ( s ) denote the efficient allocation rule. We also assume that u i ( s , x ) is twice continuously differentiable, and thus x ( s ) is differentiable almost everywhere . If x(s,, s -~) is monotonic in s,, we can impose a complete order, denoted by <, on the allocation space X such that the order on X mirrors the order of the signal space by requiring that for all si, s,!
and x(s,, S-,) # x(s:,S-,),
We endow X with the complete order defined by (19). ( x ( v ; , S -j ) , ( v ; ,S-j) ) ax (vi, s-i) dv, +t,(3,,S-;),
where ti (zi, s-,) = hi(sPi) for some arbitrary hi (s-,) .
In this section, we analyze the implications of ex-post efficient mechanisms for the ex-ante decisions of the agents to acquire information. This problem is addressed by extending the monotone environment for a single decision-maker defined by Karlin and Rubin (1956) to a multiple agent decision environment. The monotone environment is introduced first in subsection 6.1 and the informational inefficiency is analyzed in subsection 6.2.
Monotone Envisonrnent
We investigate the possibility of achieving efficient ex-ante decisions, while requiring efficiency in the second stage mechanism for an arbitrary choice of signals by the agents. This implementation requirement imposes certain restrictions on the posteriors and the utility functions. As we consider the ex-ante decision problem, the appropriate sorting and monotonicity conditions have to be formulated for the state space 0,rather than the signal space S.
The first restriction concerns the implementability of the efficient allocation. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that it is generically impossible to implement the efficient allocation if the players must submit multi-dimensional reports. Hence we assume that for each player i, there exists a one-dimensional submanifold Mi, with Mi c A(Oi), and a function hi : S, x A, + M, such that the ex-post efficient allocation x(.) can be determined by x(h(s, a ) ) rather than x(p(uls, a)), where (s,, a,) , . . . ,h,(s,, a,))
In the most straightforward case hi is an invertible mapping that associates to every posterior p, in M, exactly one signal realization s, that generates the posterior. Then (Mi, hi) can be thought of as a direct dimensionality restriction on the posterior beliefs that can be generated by a family of signals. However, hi does not have to be invertible and then hi can be thought of as a sufficient statistic relative to the social allocation problem. We briefly present illustrations for this condition below.
First, observe that for a binary state space O, = {w?, w!) the dimensionality assumption is satisfied for every class of signals, as the posterior on O, can be represented by a single number in the unit interval, say pi(si, a , ) a p,(w: Isi, a,).
Since p,(s,, a,) E [0, 11,we can take Mi = [0, 11 for all i.
A second class of information structures satisfying the assumption is giuen by the following model, sometimes referred to as the "hard news" model in the literature. Suppose 0,c R. The signal realization is with probability a, perfectly informative or si E 0,,where the conditional probability of s, = oi being realized is given by the prior distribution q,(wi); and with probability 1-a,, the signal realization is completely uninformative and hence the agent i maintains his prior as his posterior. In this class of models, the choice of ai determines the probability of observing a completely informative signal of the state.13 This class of models can be further extended to the case where conditional on receiving information, the signal is not perfectly informative, or s, = w, +E~, where E, can be distributed arbitrarily and possibly dependent on wi, or E, gi(.; w,). AS long as the distribution of the error term is assumed to be independent of the choice of a,, the posterior p(w,ls,, a , ) is independent of a, E A, and as long as si is onedimensional, the posterior will lie on a one-dimensional submanifold of A(Oi) and the requirement is satisfied. l3 We thank the co-editor for suggesting this class of information structures.
A third class of models where the dimensionality condition holds for arbitrary families of information structures is one where the payoffs are linear in the states. In this case, the payoff from allocation x in state w to agent i is given by The linear setting is the one investigated in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) as well. In our model, the state w is the primitive notion rather than the vector of signals s as in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) , and as a result, the linearity is assumed here with respect to the state rather than the signal. The reason why the dimensionality condition holds in the linear model, is that the posterior expectation of wi, expressed by
is sufficient for the determination and implementation of the efficient choice rule. Thus we let the A, : S, x A, + M, define a set of equivalent signal realizations and information acquisition decisions in the sense that each element in the equivalence class generates the same posterior expectation, or V ( s~, a i l , (s:, a:) E S,, vi(si, a,) = n-,(s;, a:) A, (s,, a , ) = A,(s(, a:).
As n-, is a real number, we can find a one-dimensional manifold M, such that Ai(si, a,) E Mi for all (si, a,) E Si x Ai.14Thus with linear preferences, the dimensionality restriction on the signals is satisfied for every family Ai of signals. This argument also shows that the basic intuition developed in the introductory example for a binary state space extends to an arbitrary state space 0 , . With this dimensionality restriction in place, we can assume without loss of generality that every signal realization si leads to a fixed posterior belief pi(milsi, a , ) independent of the choice of signal a,. Two distinct signal choices a, and a: differ in the frequency by which signal realizations s, are observed.
Next we consider the appropriate sorting and monotonicity conditions in the state space 0 . We require that for every i, the allocation space X can be endowed with a complete order, denoted by <, such that u,(x, mi, w -~) and u (x, mi, w-,) are supermodular in (x, mi) for all m-i.15 Observe that the ranking of the allocations is allowed to vary with i as in the previous section, but here the ranking has to be invariant with respect to mpi. In addition we require that for all i, the posterior probabilities satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property: for l4 Obseme that M, can always be embedded in 4 ( R , ) so that the restriction M, c 4 ( R , ) is satisfied as well. l5 In the monotone environment of Karlin and Rubin (1956) , the utility function of the decision maker was only assumed to be single-crossing in (x, w,) . The stronger condition of supermodularity is imposed here as we consider a multi-dimensional signal space and when taking the expectations over w-,, supermodularity in (x, w,) is preserved while the single-crossing property is not.
all si > si and w: > w,, pi(w:ls()p,(wilsi) -pi(wilsi)pi(wiIs:)2 0. Tlle supermodularity of u,(x, w) in (x, w,) guarantees (globally) the sorting condition, whereas the supermodularity of u (x, o i , o-,) guarantees the monotonicity of the efficient allocation. The monotone likelihood ratio condition implies that supermodularity in (x, o i ) translates into supermodularity in (x, si) when taking expectations with respect to the posterior beliefs based on the signal realizations.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose the monotone likelihood ratio and scpermodularity conditions hold for all i; then:
(i) ui(x, si, S-,) and u(x, si, s-,) are scpermod~~lar in (x, s,);
(ii) for all si, si with x(si, s _~) # x(s:, S-,),
PROOF. See Appendix.
In order to determine whether agent i has the socially correct incentives to acquire information, we must compare the returns from information acquisition for the social planner and agent i. The information provided by a signal realization s, affects both the valuation of any particular allocation x as well as the choice of the (socially) optimal allocation x(s). By incentive compatibility, the generalized VCG mechanism guarantees that the social utility and the private utility of agent i are evaluated at x(s) for every s. In the private values environment, the congruence between social and private utilities go even further since as functions of s, they are identical up to a constant, possibly dependent on s-,.
In the common value environment, in contrast, the marginal utility of s, is in general different for the social utility and the private utility of agent i. This discrepancy is due to the fact that with common values, the utility of all agents but i, u-,(x, s), is responsive to the signal realization s,. As a result, the social planner's preferences for information are in general different from the individual preferences. In order to determine how this discrepancy affects the incentives to acquire information, we make use of a characterization of the transfer function associated with the generalized VCG mechanism. THEOREM2 (Inefficiency in Mechanisms): Eveg) ex-post efJicient meclzanism:
(i) leads (weakly) to urzderacq~~isition of information by agent i if u-,(x, w,, w-,) is supermodular in (x, w,).
(ii) leads (weakly) to overacquisition of information by agent i if u-,(x, w,, w-,) is submodular in (x, w,).
We emphasize that the inefficiency result above is only a local result in the sense that we compare the decision of agent i with the planner's decision for agent i, when both take the decisions of the remaining agents as given. In particular, the theorem is not a statement about the (Nash) equilibrium decisions of the agents. The interaction between the information structures chosen by the agents may conceivably lead to an equilibrium outcome in which all agents acquire too much information relative to the social optimum even though the local prediction, based on LL-,(x, w) being, say, supermodular in (x, mi) for all i, is that all agents acquire too little information. In this case, the theorem would still tell us that relative to the equilibrium information structure a_,,the social planner would like agent i to acquire more information than i chooses to acquire in equilibrium. Observe, however, that for an important class of models, the result above is also global. This is the case where a single player has the opportunity to acquire (additional) information.
Next we give a brief outline of the proof. The key function in the proof is the difference between the social utility function and agent i's private utility function. We show that this difference (i) has a global maximum at x(s) and (ii) is supermodular in (x, si). The first attribute holds locally in the generalized VCG mechanism and can be suitably extended to a global property. The difference between social and private utility is composed of the gross utility of all agents but i and the transfer payment of agent i. The latter is constant in sj conditional on x in the generalized VCG mechanism and hence the second attribute follows by the hypothesis of supermodularity of u_;(x, o ) in (x, mi) after using Proposition 5. Finally, since the difference satisfies the same supermodularity conditions as u(x, w) and L L~( X , w), we can order signal structures in their informativeness according to the criterion of effectiveness suggested by Lehmann (1988) . As the difference is increasing in the effectiveness order, we know that the marginal value of information is larger to the social utility than to agent i's private utility.
The inefficiency results in Theorem 2 are stated simply in terms of the marginal utility of the remaining agents after excluding agent i. If the marginal preferences of the complement set to i are congruent (in their direction) with agent i, then i has insufficient incentives to acquire information. With congruent marginal preferences, the ex-post efficient mechanism induces positive informational externalities that lead agent i to underinvest in information. If the marginal utilities of agent i and all remaining agents move in opposite directions, then the resulting negative informational externality leads the agent to overinvest in information.
We conclude this section with a generalization of the single unit auction model presented earlier to a finite number of bidders and a finite state space. 111 a single unit auction, the feasible allocations are simply the assignments of the object to the various bidders, and we denote by x, the assignment of the object to agent j. We restrict attention to symmetric environments where for all w = (mi, W-,) and o' = (w:, up;) such that x(w), x(wl) # xi, we have x(w) = x(ol).
In other words, information about w, is never pivotal for an allocative decision between xi and x,~. The nature of the inefficiency in the information acquisition can then be decided on the basis of the properties of the utility function of each bidder at x,: 11, (x,, w). The utility of agent j is trivially zero for uj (x,, w) (i) leads (weakly) to underacquisition of information by agent i if u, (x,, o r ,w-,) is izonincreasing in o,for all j # i;
(ii) leads (weakly) to overacquisition of information by agent i if LL, (x,, w,, w-,) is nondecreasing in w, for all j # i.
. CONCLUSION
This paper considers the efficiency of information acquisition in a mechanism design context. In the private values world, any mechanism that implements the efficient allocation, also leads to an efficient level of information acquisition by the agents ex-ante. The efficiency results with private values also extend to a setting where the information is acquired sequentially before a final social allocation is implemented.
The common value model we investigated here is one where the components oi of the state of the world w = (w,, . . . , o,) are distributed independently. The results in this paper can be generalized to settings including ones where the signals are single dimensional and independent conditional on the state of the world as long as we make the appropriate assumptions on utilities in terms of allocations and signals directly. If we move away from ex-post implementation to Bayesian implementation, the mechanisms suggested by McLean (1985, 1988) can be adapted to our environment to induce efficient information acquisition in models with correlated signals. Finally, this paper considered information acquisition with a fixed number of agents. It may be of interest to investigate the limiting model as the number of agents gets large. Intuitively, one might expect that the problem of each individual agent might be closer to the private value model. If the responsiveness of the marginal utility of all other agents to the signal of agent i declines, then the subor supermodularity of u-,(x, s) in (x, s,) may vanish and yield efficiency in the limit.
APPENDIX
The appendix collects the proofs to the propositions and theorems in the main body of the text. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: A necessaly and sufficient condition for a local social optimum a is that for all i, a, solves In contrast, the expected equilibrium utility of agent i under the VCG mechanism is maximized by a , where where h(p-,) can be omitted from the objective function using independence: -ll(p-,) . The equivalence of (22) PROOF OF PROPOSITION4: The sufficient conditions with a continuum of allocations can be obtained directly by considering the conditions of the discrete allocation model in the limit as the set of discrete allocations converges to the set of a continuum of allocations. The details are omitted.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION5: By assumption, ~ ( x , w , , w-,) 1s supermodular in ( x , w,) for eveiy w-,. The supermodular~ty property is prese~ved under expectations:
and a fortiori ~ ( x , w , , s-,) satisfies the single crossing property in ( x , w,) . By Lemma 1 of Karlin and Rubin (1956) , it follows that ~ ( x , s,, s-,) satisfies the single crossing property in ( x , s,) . A similar argument applies to u , ( x , o , , s-,) . Furthermore, by Theorem 1 of Karlin and Rubin (1956) ,it follows that an optimal strategy which is monotone in s, exists. This proves the first part of the theorem.
If ~ ( x , o , , s-,) is supermodular in ( x , w,) for every s-,, then u ( x , s,, s-,) , defined as is also supermodular in ( x , s,) by Theorem 3.10.1 in Topkis (1998) since p, (s,, w , ) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio.
Q.E.D.
If a function g(x, s) exists such that G(x, s) satisfies the properties (a)-(c), then G(x, s) satisfies assumption (i) and (ii) of Lehmann's theorem. Moreover the expected value of G(x, s) evaluated at x = x(s) is equal to u-, (x, s) +t,(x) evaluated at x = x(s). To accomplish this define an auxiliary function b(s) by and define g(x, s) to be
It is now easy to verify that G(.x, s) shares the supermodularity properties of u(.x, s), has a global maximum at x = x(s) for every s, and indeed g(x(s), s) = 0. It remains to take expectations. We maintain s-, to be fixed. We take the expectation with respect to the distribution Fat and Fag and denote and G ( 4 , s-,) 2 Li[G(x(s,, 3-,I, (s,, s-,))l~"{].
It then follows by Lehmann's theorem that if a , is more effective than a:, we have From (a)-(c), we can then conclude that adopting again the notation that u-,(ff,, ~-, ) + t , ( f f , , S-,) AIE,, [u-,(.x(s,, s-,) , (s,, s-,)) +t,(x(s,, s-,))F"I], and similarly for a; By (30), this is equivalent to
As the inequality holds for every s-,, it remains to hold after taking expectation over the realization of s-,, which concludes the proof. The corresponding result for submodularity can be obtained by simply reversing the inequalities.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: This theorem is a special case of Theorem 2 after introducing the following ranking for the allocations. With a single unit auction, the set of allocations is simply the assignment of the object to a particular bidder. For every i, partition the set of allocations X into x, and x-, and order the assignments such that I, > x-,. (The order among the remaining bidders is irrelevant.) By definition of the single object auction To verify the supermodularity property, it is therefore sufficient to examine the behavior of as a function of w,. Similarly for u_,(x, o ) . The result is now a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
